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The thesis that in order to genuinely think about a particular object one must be (in some 
sense) acquainted with that object has been thoroughly explored since it was put forward by 
Bertrand Russell. Recently, the thesis has come in for mounting criticism. The aim of this 
paper is to point out that neither the exploration nor the criticism have been sensitive to the 
fact that the thesis can be interpreted in two different ways, yielding two different principles 
of acquaintance. One principle uses the notion of content in distinguishing genuine thinking-
about things from a merely derivative kind of thinking-about things. The other principle is 
quiet about content, focusing instead on a distinction between satisfactional and non-
satisfactional means of bringing things into thought. Most work has focused on the first, 
content-based principle of acquaintance. But criticisms of this principle do not apply 
straightforwardly to the non-content-based principle. I shall argue that the latter principle 
merits independent assessment as part of the broader effort to account for genuine thinking 
about particular objects. In the final section of the paper, I will sketch a roadmap for this 
assessment. 
 
1 
 
Suppose Jane is thinking about tigers—she is thinking that they are beautiful and scary. Greta 
is a tiger whom Jane has never encountered. Is Jane thinking about Greta? There is a sense in 
which she is. Her thought applies to Greta. But she is thinking about Greta only insofar as she 
	 2	
is thinking about tigers and Greta is a tiger. Greta is not in her thought in any way over and 
above this. Now suppose Jane is thinking that the biggest of all tigers must be beautiful and 
scary, and suppose Greta is in fact the biggest of all tigers. Is Jane thinking about Greta? 
Again, there is a sense in which she is: her thought applies to Greta; Greta is the (unique) 
satisfier of the condition (being the biggest tiger) that Jane is thinking of. But again, Jane is 
thinking about Greta only insofar as she is thinking about being the biggest of all tigers and 
Greta is the biggest of all tigers. Greta is not in her thought in any way over and above this. 
 
In general, we can distinguish a loose sense in which thoughts are about things to which they 
apply from a more substantial notion of a thing’s independently being in thought. What can 
we say about this more substantial notion? What is it for a thing to be in thought (and not 
merely to be thought about, in the looser sense)? (In what follows I will sometimes use 
“being-in-thought” to refer to the phenomenon of genuinely being in thought, as distinguished 
from being thought about, in the looser sense.) 
 
Bertrand Russell gave a partial answer to this question: for a thing to be in thought, the 
thinker must be acquainted with the thing. This is now known as Russell’s “Principle of 
Acquaintance.” I take Russell’s basic statement of this principle to be the following: 
 
Russell’s Basic Principle of Acquaintance 
“All thinking has to start from acquaintance; but it succeeds in thinking about many 
things with which we have no acquaintance.” (1905, 874) 
 
The principle is the part in boldface. The continuation of the sentence serves to contrast the 
substantial notion of being-in-thought that is claimed to require acquaintance, from the looser 
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notion of being thought about that includes satisfying a condition that is in thought. This 
looser, satisfactional way of being thought about requires a “start” in things that are thought 
about in the more substantial way. Russell’s Basic Principle of Acquaintance says that for a 
thing to be in thought in this starting, non-satisfactional way, the thinker must be acquainted 
with it.  
 
Russell also endorsed the following principle of acquaintance: 
 
Russell’s Propositional Principle of Acquaintance 
“Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents 
with which we are acquainted.” (1910/11, 117) 
 
For Russell, this principle is another way of stating his Basic Principle of Acquaintance, since 
he held that being in thought in the more substantial, non-satisfactional sense is necessary and 
sufficient for being a constituent of a proposition that is grasped in thought. But at least on the 
surface, these are different principles of acquaintance. Russell’s Propositional Principle of 
Acquaintance puts an acquaintance requirement on being a constituent of a proposition 
grasped in thought. Russell’s Basic Principle of Acquaintance, by contrast, puts an 
acquaintance requirement on being at the non-satisfactional “start” of thinking about. 
 
These principles of acquaintance are supposed to be informative about how things get into 
thought. Their point is not simply that grasping propositions happens to require acquaintance 
with the constituents of those propositions, or that it happens to be the case that only things 
with which we are acquainted can be in thought non-satisfactionally. Rather, the idea behind 
the principles is that acquaintance is required because a thing’s being thought about non-
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satisfactionally or being a constituent of a proposition grasped in thought derives from the 
thinker’s being acquainted with it. The strongest form of this idea is that a thing’s being-in-
thought (understood in either way) just is the thinker’s acquaintance with the thing.  
 
This sounds wrong if being-in-thought is considered as an occurrent phenomenon while 
acquaintance is considered as a non-occurrent phenomenon. For, as Russell noted, one might 
at a given time be acquainted with many things that are not, in an occurrent way, in one’s 
thought at that time. (1910/11, 109) However, acquaintance can also be considered as an 
occurrent phenomenon. Russell described occurrent acquaintance with a thing as being 
directly aware of or being presented with the thing. So, we can characterize the idea behind 
the principles as follows: a thing’s being-in-thought derives from its being presented to the 
thinker—from an episode of occurrent acquaintance with the thing.  
 
 
 
2 
 
Of course, these principles are not informative until “acquaintance” is defined. Philosophers 
from Russell onward have had different ideas about what counts as acquaintance. A common 
thread is that perception is critical, at least with respect to acquaintance with particulars. 
Russell thought that the particulars with which we are acquainted are our own sense data 
because, as a sense datum theorist, he thought that these are what we really perceive. Current 
writers tend to go in the other direction, extending acquaintance to cover not only perception 
of external objects, but also awareness of them deriving from perception, such as perception-
based memory of them, uptake from others’ linguistic reference to them (where this linguistic 
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reference is ultimately based on someone’s perception of the object), or memory of them 
based on earlier linguistic uptake.3 Robin Jeshion gives a useful formulation of a liberal 
version of this extension: 
 
Jeshion’s “Standard-Standard on Acquaintance”:  
“One can be acquainted with an object O only by perception, memory, and 
communication chains.” (2010, 109) 
 
Jeshion’s Standard-Standard suggests the following requirement for occurrent acquaintance:  
To be occurrently acquainted with an object one must either be: (i) perceiving the 
object, (ii) being referred to the object4 via a communication chain originating in 
someone’s perception of the object, or (iii) remembering the object (with the memory 
deriving either from one’s past perceptions of the object or from one’s past uptake of 
the object via language).  
 
This requirement may raise concerns because it seems to exclude abstract objects from being 
objects of occurrent acquaintance, given that (as many believe) they cannot be perceived. If 
so, then the truth of either acquaintance principle would exclude abstract objects from being 
in thought. It is a substantive question whether abstract objects can be perceived, and it 
depends to some degree on how one understands perception. Charles Parsons (1980) and 
Penelope Maddy (1980), for instance, develop accounts of mathematical intuition that treats 
the intuiting of certain abstract mathematical objects as, in effect, a variety of perception. 
Treatment of this matter is beyond the scope of the present paper. I will follow the fairly 
																																																						
3 Dickie (2016) calls this the “extended acquaintance tradition.” Hawthorne and Manley (2012) call it “causal 
acquaintance.” 
4 Here I use “being referred to the object” in roughly the same way as Bach (2008): in understanding a use of a 
word to refer to an object, one is referred to that object.   
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standard practice in current discussions of acquaintance requirements, and restrict my 
discussion to concrete objects.5  
 
In addition to adopting something like the Standard-Standard on acquaintance, current 
discussions focus on acquaintance requirements that are more in the vein of Russell’s 
Propositional Principle of Acquaintance than his Basic Principle of Acquaintance. Current 
writers typically are committed neither to the wholly propositional nature of thought nor to 
Russell’s particular metaphysics of propositions, according to which propositions are abstract 
objects having worldly objects and properties as literal constituents. A more general 
descendent of the Propositional Principle of Acquaintance, which also takes account of the 
refinements just discussed, can be stated as follows: 
 
Content Principle of Acquaintance (CPA): 
For a concrete object to figure in the content of one’s occurrent thought, one must be 
occurrently acquainted with the object—that is, one must be perceiving the object, 
being referred to it via a perception-based linguistic communication chain, or 
remembering it via one of those two kinds of earlier experience. 
 
An object’s figuring in the content of thought is often described as the thought being a 
“singular thought” about that object. Singular thought and the CPA have been the focus for 
recent investigations of the role for acquaintance in accounting for the substantial kind of 
being-in-thought. CPA has been the subject of much criticism. Some have even suggested that 
																																																						
5 If abstract objects cannot be perceived, then rejection of a Standard-Standard acquaintance requirement on 
concrete objects being-in-thought might be a positive development, as it would allow a unified treatment of 
being-in-thought across both abstract and concrete objects. (Jeshion 2002, 57 suggests this.) Nonetheless, if an 
acquaintance requirement is defensible with respect to concrete objects, this cannot be ignored simply in the 
interest of ensuring a unified account. 
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problems with CPA show that the notion of acquaintance “is a dispensable relic of a bygone 
era in the philosophy of language and mind.” (Hawthorne and Manley 2012, 25)  In section 4, 
I will argue that however powerful the evidence against CPA may be, a claim like this is at 
best premature. The reason is that the Basic Principle of Acquaintance affords another 
potentially important role for the putative relic of acquaintance. It needs to be assessed 
separately from CPA. Nonetheless, the kinds of problems that arise for CPA are instructive, 
both in making the case that BPA deserves separate attention, and in making a start on 
evaluating BPA. Given this, I will briefly review the case against CPA in the next section. 
 
 
 
3 
 
Criticisms of CPA can be divided into two categories: arguments by counterexample and 
arguments by failure of motivation. The counterexample-based arguments adduce cases in 
which, intuitively, an object figures in the content of thought (the thought is a “singular 
thought” about the object), but in which the thinker has no acquaintance (in the extended 
Standard-Standard sense) with the object. The arguments by failure of motivation aim to show 
that traditional explanatory roles for acquaintance requirements on singular thought can be 
filled in other ways, or that acquaintance requirements do not in fact play those roles.   
 
Counterexamples to CPA need to evoke the intuition that an object is figuring in the content 
of occurrent thought, although the thinker is not perceiving the object, being referred to it in 
language, or remembering it via one of those two kinds of earlier experience. The first part of 
this intuition concerns a theoretical status: an object’s figuring in the content of thought, or 
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the thought’s being singular with respect to the thing. Critics of CPA acknowledge that one’s 
intuitions about this matter will be shaped by one’s theory of singular thought.6 Their general 
strategy, however, is to use a rich diet of examples to issue the challenge: if you are going to 
draw a distinction between thought whose content is singular as opposed to general with 
respect to an object, do you not want at least some of these cases to fall on the singular side? 
If you do, and you endorse CPA, you have a problem, because in none of these cases is the 
thinker perceiving the object, being referred linguistically to the object via a perception-based 
communication chain, or remembering the object through either of these kinds of earlier 
experience.  
 
The kinds of examples used to issue this challenge include inference cases, future existents 
cases, linguistic cases, and map cases. First, there seem to be cases of thinking singularly 
about a thing whose existence one infers, though one has no perception-based link to it. For 
instance, a car mechanic might infer from the appearance of a car that it has an engine which 
has not been well treated, and think that that engine is destroyed. Second, there seem to be 
cases of thinking singularly about a thing that one has reason to believe will come to exist, 
despite there being no possibility of a perception-based link, as the thing does not yet exist. 
For instance, one might intend to have a child, and think that that child will have light hair. 
Third, there seem to be cases of thinking singularly about a thing using a name or indexical 
expression, despite having no perception-based link to it. For instance, one might use the 
word “I” to think of oneself in a way that is (arguably) not based on any perception of one by 
oneself or by anyone else. Or one might use a name like “Mitochondrial Eve,” which was 
introduced without any perceptual link to the individual it names,7 to think of a particular 
																																																						
6 See, for instance, Jeshion (2010, 112-13) and Hawthorne and Manley (2012, 3-4). 
7 In human genetics, “Mitochondrial Eve” is the name given to the most recent matrilineal common ancestor of 
all currently living humans. 
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individual. Fourth, there seem to be cases of thinking singularly about a location using a map 
(physical or mental), despite having no extended perceptual link to that location. For instance, 
a cartographer might map the coastline of an island and use it to think that that (spatially 
identified) inland location, which neither he nor anyone he is in contact with has ever 
perceived, is windy.8 
 
Putative counterexamples such as these may cast doubt on CPA. But one can also ask what 
reason there is to endorse CPA in the first place. A cluster of traditional motivations relate to 
what I will call the “focus-shifting manoeuvre.” It seems that if Jane is able to think about 
there being a biggest of all tigers, then nothing stops her from shifting her cognitive focus 
from this condition to its satisfier. She might do this by introducing a name for whoever is the 
biggest tiger and going on to think with that name, or by thinking in a way that she might 
express as concerning “that animal—the one who is in fact the biggest tiger.”9 If Jane can 
shift her cognitive focus in this way, then it is not clear why the content of her thought should 
not also shift. Why should it not be that Jane goes from thinking that among the tigers the one 
who is biggest is beautiful and scary, to thinking that that tiger—the biggest one—is beautiful 
and scary?  
 
The focus-shifting manoeuvre has suggested to some that “semantic instrumentalism”10 is 
true. This is the view that if a thinker can entertain a content containing a condition she 
believes satisfied, and if she can introduce a name (or other term) whose reference she 
stipulates to be fixed by that condition, then she can use that name to entertain a content 
																																																						
8 These examples are drawn from or inspired by the discussions in Jeshion (2010) and Hawthorne and Manley 
(2012). As Hawthorne and Manley note, similar examples have been discussed by a range of other philosophers, 
notably Sosa (1970), Jeshion (2002), McGinn (1981), and Sutton (2001).  
9 This would be a mental equivalent of introducing a Kaplanian “dthat” term. (Kaplan 1989) 
10 “Semantic instrumentalism” is Jeshion’s name for the view, which is typically traced to Kaplan (1989), and is 
also attributed to Harman (1977) and Borg (2007).  
	 10	
containing the satisfier of that condition. But most theorists reject semantic instrumentalism, 
presumably because it lets things into “singular thought” too easily. This is one motivation for 
positing substantive requirements on figuring in the content of thought, such as CPA.11 
 
Another problem that derives from the focus-shifting manoeuvre is that the manoeuvre seems 
to allow us to gain new knowledge too easily. If Jane knows that among all the tigers, one is 
biggest, why can she not shift her focus to that individual—Greta—and come to know 
something she did not know before: namely, that Greta is the biggest tiger?  
 
CPA seems to offer an explanation. Jane does not come to know anything new by this 
procedure because she does not come to entertain a new content that attributes being the 
biggest tiger to the individual who is in fact the biggest tiger, Greta. For her thought to have 
this content, the thought would have to be derived from acquaintance with Greta. But Jane’s 
shift in cognitive focus has done nothing to remedy her lack of acquaintance with Greta.  
 
Hawthorne and Manley challenge this explanation by imagining similar procedures which do 
remedy Jane’s lack of acquaintance with Greta. Suppose Jane has a magic arm that will reach 
out and allow her to touch whoever is the biggest tiger. Jane can then name this individual 
“Biggie.” This naming, and Jane’s subsequent thought using the name, do derive from Jane’s 
(tactile) perception-based acquaintance with Greta. Alternatively, suppose Jane orders a 
magical fairy to go and find the biggest tiger, become perceptually acquainted with that 
individual, and name her “Biggie.” When the fairy returns and tells Jane “Biggie is the 
biggest tiger,” Jane is referred via a perception-based linguistic communication chain to 
Greta. Despite all this, Hawthorne and Manley think, we should be no happier attributing new 
																																																						
11 A different supplementary requirement is Jeshion’s (2010) requirement that anything figuring in the content of 
thought be thought about using a mental file. 
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knowledge to Jane in these cases than in a case where she simply performs the focus-shifting 
manoeuvre. And if Jane’s gaining acquaintance via these procedures does not create new 
knowledge, then Jane’s not gaining acquaintance via the original procedure does not explain 
why the original procedure does not create new knowledge. 
 
A similar point could be made about using CPA to avoid semantic instrumentalism. If using 
the magic arm or the magic fairy would still be too easy a way to have singular thoughts about 
things, then the problem with semantic instrumentalism is not that the semantic version of the 
focus-shifting manoeuvre does not acquaint the thinker with the satisfier of the condition. For 
even if it did, our intuition would still be that singular thought is not so easily obtained. 
 
 
4 
 
With this brief review I have provided only a partial sketch of the case against CPA, and I 
have made no evaluation of it. This is because my interest is not in rejecting or defending 
CPA but in pointing out that however strong the case against CPA may be, it is not the whole 
story of whether acquaintance requirements have a place in a right account of being-in-
thought. Although Russell treated his version of CPA as another way of expressing the Basic 
Principle of Acquaintance, they are different principles. If CPA is false, this does not entail 
that the Basic Principle of Acquaintance is false.  
 
Here is a version of Russell’s Basic Principle of Acquaintance, that “all thinking has to start 
from acquaintance,” revised and restricted in parallel with the statement of CPA in section B. 
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Basic Principle of Acquaintance (BPA): 
For a concrete object to be in one’s occurrent thought in non-satisfactional way, one 
must be occurrently acquainted with the object—that is, one must be perceiving the 
object, being referred to it via a perception-based linguistic communication chain, or 
remembering it via one of those two kinds of earlier experience. 
 
For BPA to entail CPA, figuring in the content of thought would have to entail being thought 
about in a non-satisfactional way. For CPA to entail BPA, being thought about in a non-
satisfactional way would have to entail figuring in the content of thought. It is not obvious 
that either of these is the case. Take the car mechanic case mentioned above: in the 
mechanic’s thought that that engine is destroyed, it is supposed to be the engine that figures in 
the content of the thought, even though, at least arguably, the engine is thought about only by 
satisfying a condition that is in thought, such as being the engine in that car. If this is right, 
then figuring in the content of thought does not entail being thought about in a non-
satisfactional way, hence BPA does not entail CPA. 
 
It also seems at least possible that, although the car is (let us suppose) thought about in a non-
satisfactional way, it does not figure in the content of thought. (The thought is about the 
engine, not the car.) Of course, this depends on the details of one’s theory of thought contents. 
But if it is coherent, then it is not obvious that being thought about in a non-satisfactional way 
entails figuring in the content of thought. Thus it is coherent to endorse CPA but reject BPA. 
 
The important point for my purposes, though, is that BPA does not entail CPA; hence if CPA 
is false, this does not entail that BPA is false. Furthermore, the question with which I began 
the paper—what can we say about being-in-thought in the substantial sense that contrasts with 
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satisfying a condition in thought?—is of interest even if one does not restate the question in 
terms of content.   
 
Maintaining non-satisfactional aboutness as the important mark of genuine being-in-thought, 
instead of focusing on singular content, has some advantages. One is that no problem of 
semantic instrumentalism arises. One can think about something via a condition that the thing 
satisfies, and one can introduce a name whose reference one stipulates to be fixed by that 
condition. One can go on to use that name in thinking about the thing. None of this changes 
the fact that one is thinking about the thing by means of its satisfying a condition that is in 
thought. Even if one goes on to think about the thing using the name without keeping the 
condition in occurrent thought, one’s previous occurrent thought about the condition is still 
part of the means by which one is now thinking about the thing. No semantic manoeuvre can 
kick away the essential role for the condition in making one’s thought be about the thing. The 
only way for this to change is for one to acquire a different, non-satisfactional way of thinking 
about the thing.  
 
Another advantage of focusing on non-satisfactional aboutness is that it may present a 
different way to deal with the problem of too-easy knowledge. Once we think of knowing 
something as knowing a content, we are faced with the problem that the focus-shifting 
manoeuvre seems to allow one to entertain a content that one is thereby (in virtue of having 
used that very procedure) in a position to know. If CPA and related substantive requirements 
on figuring in singular contents turn out to be unmotivated, the question remains of why 
knowledge cannot be gained by the focus-shifting procedure. Hawthorne and Manley’s 
suggestion seems to be that new knowledge can be gained in this way, it is just that the 
knowledge is not “interesting” or “momentous” (2012, 67). This is not altogether satisfying. 
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Suppose we instead treat knowledge that (e.g.) Greta is the biggest tiger as knowledge of the 
fact of Greta’s being the biggest tiger.12 One way to conceive of knowing a fact is as having 
that fact in thought. Having a fact in thought is different from having (in the simple case) an 
object in thought and a property in thought, and doing a cognitive operation to ascribe the 
property to the object. Even if the ascription happens to be true, this is not enough for having 
the fact (that the object has the property) in thought. This is analogous to the intuition that 
having tigers in thought and bigness in thought, and doing a cognitive operation to form the 
condition of being the biggest tiger, is not sufficient for having Greta in thought.  
 
I would then suggest that in the same way that Jane thinks of Greta only by thinking with the 
condition the biggest of all tigers, she thinks of (the fact of) Greta’s being the biggest of all 
tigers only by thinking with the condition someone’s being the biggest of all tigers.13 The 
former condition is satisfied by Greta; the latter is satisfied by the fact of Greta’s being the 
biggest of all tigers. Thus, neither Greta nor the fact of Greta’s being the biggest of all tigers 
are genuinely in Jane’s thought after she uses the focus-shifting procedure. Accordingly, no 
new knowledge of facts is gained.  
 
One might worry that this approach to the problem still leaves it open that in the case where 
Jane employs the magic fairy to gain acquaintance with the satisfier of the condition, she does 
gain new knowledge. For it seems that when the fairy says, “Biggie is the biggest tiger,” this 
																																																						
12 Admittedly, treating knowledge that such-and-such as knowledge of worldly facts is a minority approach. (See 
Kratzer 2002 for a relatively recent defense, though she does not conceive of knowing a fact in the way I suggest 
below.) What follows in the text should only be taken as suggestive of a different sort of approach to the 
problem of too-easy knowledge that does not involve a focus on content. 
13 Note that one might also think of Greta’s being the biggest of all tigers satisfactionally in the following way. 
Suppose one thinks of Greta (non-satisfactionally, we may suppose) and, because of her large size, assumes that 
she is the biggest of all tigers. One thus forms a condition in thought, (the fact of) Greta’s being the biggest of all 
tigers, which is in fact satisfied by (the fact of) Greta’s being the biggest of all tigers. But this fact is not in 
thought in any way over and above satisfying this condition. 
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enables Jane to think about the fact of Biggie’s (Greta’s) being the biggest tiger in a way that 
is arguably non-satisfactional.14 This is a plausible upshot, but I do not think it is a problem 
for the approach. For the approach offers an explanation of why (despite potentially 
countervailing intuitions) the fairy procedure might create new knowledge of facts while the 
initial focus-shifting procedure does not. The explanation is that the fairy procedure gives one 
a non-satisfactional way of thinking of certain facts, which is, on this approach, what it is to 
know them. And while one can build the case (as Hawthorne and Manley do with the fairy 
case) so that this knowledge is of little instrumental significance, the knowledge is significant 
in other ways. 
 
This is illustrated by an example that Jeshion (2010) discusses, of an adoptee who yearns to 
meet his biological mother.15 The adoptee knows that he has a unique biological mother, so he 
can use the focus-shifting procedure to think about the fact that she is his biological mother. 
But he thinks about this fact only by means of thinking of someone’s being my unique 
biological mother.16 The man goes on this way for many years, marvelling at the fact that he 
does have a mother, and pondering over what she might be like. Now let us add to Jeshion’s 
example that, at long last, the man saves up enough money to hire a private detective to go out 
and locate his biological mother. The detective returns and tells the man, “I found her. She is 
your mother, all right.” It seems to me that even if nothing further follows from this (maybe 
the detective suddenly drops dead and none of his records can be located), something has 
																																																						
14 Notice that the magic arm case does not obviously have the same result. It may be that Jane thinks about 
Biggie/Greta in a non-satisfactional way through touching Greta with the hand of her magic arm, but it is less 
clear that she thinks about the fact of Greta’s being the biggest tiger in a non-satisfactional way. More plausibly, 
she thinks about her touching the biggest tiger in a non-satisfactional way, and thinks about the fact that Greta is 
the biggest tiger only by means of thinking with the condition, this thing’s being the biggest tiger, which the 
latter fact satisfies. By contrast, she can now think of the fact of Greta’s being solid, or having other tactile 
features, in a non-satisfactional way.  
15 Jeshion adapts the example from one used in Velleman (2008). 
16 Jeshion uses this case to evoke the intuition that the adoptee is able to entertain singular contents about his 
mother (presumably, despite the fact that his means of thinking of her is satisfactional). Jeshion does not discuss 
the case in terms of facts or ways of thinking about them. 
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changed. Although this change does not open up new possibilities for the man to act, it is 
nonetheless interesting and momentous. The fact of a particular person’s being his mother has 
come into the man’s thought in a new way. He is no longer thinking of this fact by thinking 
with the condition, someone’s being my unique biological mother. Rather, another person has 
encountered this fact and reported it to him. He thus gains knowledge of that fact that he did 
not have before.  
 
These reflections on the problem of too-easy knowledge are far from conclusive. They are 
only intended to give the flavour of an approach one might take if one maintains non-
satisfactional aboutness, rather than singular content, as the primary mark of being-in-thought. 
When singular content is adopted as the primary mark of being-in-thought, problems like 
semantic instrumentalism and too-easy knowledge invite theorists to place substantive 
requirements on content-inclusion, such as CPA. By contrast, when non-satisfactional 
aboutness is the focus, semantic instrumentalism does not arise, and other avenues are 
available for addressing the problem of too-easy knowledge. Since these problems connect to 
basic commitments about being-in-thought, this provides some inducement to focus on non-
satisfactional aboutness as the mark of being-in-thought, and to assess BPA rather than—or at 
least as well as—CPA in the effort to give an account of being-in-thought. In the final part of 
the paper, I will take a first step in this direction by outlining the initial plausibility of BPA 
and the kinds of challenges against which it should be tested. 
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5 
 
If concrete objects can be thought about in a non-satisfactional way, what would that way be? 
An answer that immediately presents itself is that we can perceive concrete objects, or get told 
about them by others who have perceived them, and we can remember them through these 
experiences. In other words, we think about them by means of our acquaintance (in the 
Standard-Standard sense) with them. Acquaintance with concrete objects seems to be a 
paradigm means of thinking about them in a non-satisfactional way.17 This does not imply 
that all non-satisfactional thinking about concrete objects is via acquaintance. But it provides 
some initial motivation for BPA and sets the task of challenging BPA by identifying ways of 
thinking about concrete objects that are not via acquaintance.  
 
One place to look is among the putative counterexamples to CPA mentioned above. These are 
examples in which it is supposed to be intuitive that the content of thought is singular with 
respect to some object, although the thought is not derived from the thinker’s acquaintance 
with that object. If it is also intuitive in some of these cases that the relevant object is thought 
about in a non-satisfactional way, then these cases could serve as counterexamples to BPA.  
 
Inference cases, future existents cases, and maps cases do not clearly fit this bill. As 
described, the cases do not elicit the intuition that the things are thought about non-
satisfactionally. Indeed, it seems plausible (for example) that the car mechanic thinks of a 
particular car engine by means of thinking with the condition the engine of this car. It seems 
plausible that an individual contemplating his future thinks of some particular future child of 
																																																						
17 Some hold that perceiving concrete objects only lets us think about them in a satisfactional way (e.g., Searle 
1983). One who had such a view might reject BPA, if (but only if) she also held that there are other, non-
perception-based non-satisfactional ways of thinking about concrete objects. I discuss some possibilities in this 
vein below. 
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his by means of thinking of the condition the (first/only, etc.) child that I will have. It seems 
plausible that the cartographer thinks of a particular area on the island he charts by means of 
thinking with the condition the area that is such-and-such distance in such-and-such direction 
from this point on this coastline. 
 
Cases of thinking of things using linguistic devices seem more promising as potential 
counterexamples to BPA. A thinker might understand sentences like “I am hungry” or 
“Mitochondrial Eve lived over 100,000 years ago,” and thereby think of herself or of a certain 
human being, but not in virtue of thinking of, or with, conditions that she or that human being 
satisfies. (She might not know the reference-fixing condition associated with the name 
“Mitochondrial Eve,” despite having picked up the name in biology class.) Rather, it might be 
suggested, the linguistic conventions governing the expressions determine referents for uses 
of those expressions. If she can refer to those things, and understand these claims about them, 
it is not clear why we should not also allow that she is thinking of those things.  
 
Some have questioned the view that being able to refer in language to a thing, and to 
understand talk about it, is sufficient for being able to think about it.18 Even if we accept this 
(as I am inclined to), we may question whether the semantic operation of introducing a name 
like “Mitochondrial Eve” via a reference-fixing description enables anyone to think about the 
satisfier of that description in a non-satisfactional way. If such semantic manoeuvres do not 
have this power (as suggested in section 4), then a speaker who picks up this name from 
another speaker acquires (at most) the ability to think about Mitochondrial Eve in a 
satisfactional way, albeit by means of the source speaker’s thinking with the condition the 
matrilineal most recent common ancestor of all currently living humans.  
																																																						
18 Most notably, Gareth Evans (1982, chapter 11). See also McGinn (1981). 
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In addition, there is a question about the order of determination. When thinking with words, 
does one think of things in virtue of thinking with words governed by linguistic conventions 
that (perhaps relative to context) determine those things as referents? Or does one refer using 
those words to those things in virtue of the fact that one’s use of the words results from 
thinking about those things? I think there is reason to favour the latter view.19 Further, it is not 
clear what it takes for a use of a word to be governed by a reference-determining 
convention.20 Such considerations suggest that it is difficult to make the case that linguistic 
conventions can make things be in thought. 
 
Nonetheless, the example of indexical expressions in particular points to a stronger challenge 
to BPA. Independent of conventional linguistic expressions, we seem to have a special, “first-
personal” way of thinking of persons, places, and times. We think of persons as I, places as 
here, and times as now. (By which I do not imply that we have to use those words, or any 
words.) At least to many philosophers, this first-personal way of thinking of things has 
seemed to be independent of any perception, memory, or linguistic reference to the things 
thought of. But it also seems clear that at least some things thought of in this way must be in 
thought in a non-satisfactional way. For if I think of (for instance) my present location in a 
satisfactional way, by means of thinking with the condition, being the place where I am now, 
then the question arises of how I am thinking of myself and of the present time, which figure 
in that condition. If it is by thinking with the condition, being the person who is here now, a 
circularity immediately emerges. Either first-person thought about myself, my time, and my 
																																																						
19 I make the case for this in Pepp (forthcoming). 
20 The difficulty of making out what it is for a convention to be “in force” for a use of a word has been 
emphasized by Pagin (1987) and Glüer and Pagin (1999). I develop this difficulty with respect to the reference 
of words, as used, specifically in Pepp (forthcoming). 
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location comes as a unit,21 or some of these are thought about in a non-satisfactional way 
while others are thought about satisfactionally. Either way, there is some first person thinking 
that is non-satisfactional. If this is right, and if some of the things thought of in this way are 
concrete objects, then BPA is false.  
 
For the sake of argument, I will accept that some of the things thought of in this way (for 
example, people) are concrete objects. Then the main point I want to make here is that BPA 
depends on the correctness of a broadly perceptual account of what makes first-person 
thought be about things. This is a substantial challenge to BPA, as such accounts are widely 
believed to run afoul of a central desideratum. The desideratum is that an account of what 
makes first person thought be about things should entail that an individual’s first person 
thought—be it I-thought, now-thought, or here-thought—cannot fail to be about that person, 
or the time or place of her thought. Yet, if things are brought into first-person thought via 
perception, it is not clear how this desideratum could be guaranteed. If one lacks perceptual 
contact with oneself or one’s spatiotemporal location, one’s first-person thought could not be 
about these things, violating the desideratum.22 Similarly, if one’s perceptual contact is with 
something other than oneself or one’s spatiotemporal location, one’s first-person thought 
could not be about these things, again violating the desideratum.23 
 
Evaluation of this challenge to BPA requires (i) assessing whether it is really a desideratum 
for an account of first-person being-in-thought that it should entail this kind of stickiness to 
the thinker, and (ii) assessing whether a perceptual account really violates this desideratum. 
These are big questions with a literature of their own, into which I will not enter here.24 For 
																																																						
21 As suggested by Evans 1982, 153. 
22 Anscombe (1975, 58). 
23 See Campbell (1994) and O’Brien (2007, chapter 3). 
24 See, for instance, Campbell (1994), O’Brien (2007) and (1995), Morgan (2015), Peacocke (2008, 2014). 
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purposes of the present paper, I am content to tie the truth of BPA to these questions. They are 
key questions to answer in the effort to understand whether acquaintance, in the broad 
perceptual sense that I have been using that term, is essential to genuine being-in-thought for 
concrete objects. 
 
Another source of counterexamples might be what David Kaplan (2012) calls “evidence 
cases.”  In these cases, one thinks about a thing by means of some evidence one has of it, but 
the condition one uses to think about the thing is not in fact satisfied by the thing. 
Additionally, it is supposed to be intuitive about these cases that one has no perception-based 
acquaintance with the thing. Kaplan describes a case in which his computer appears to have 
been stolen. He goes in search of what he would describe as “the person who stole my 
computer,” and finds the person he was looking for. However, it turns out that “unbeknown to 
either of us, he has an ownership right in the computer, so it wasn’t actually a theft or (on the 
basis of some even more fantastic scenario) it isn’t actually a computer.” (2012, 144) It seems 
that all along Kaplan was thinking of that person (plotting revenge upon him, wondering how 
he could be so selfish, and so on) though not in virtue of the person satisfying the condition 
that Kaplan used to think about him, and not by means of having perceived the person, or 
having been told about the person by anyone who has perceived him. Thus, this appears to be 
a case of non-satisfactional but non-acquaintance-based thinking about the person, and so a 
counterexample to BPA. 
 
However, both the “non-satisfactional” and the “non-acquaintance-based” parts of this 
judgment can be questioned. One might argue that in such cases there is always a “back-up” 
condition in thought that is satisfied by the thing thought about, and that this is really the 
means by which the thinker thinks about the thing. For instance, it might be claimed that 
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Kaplan is also thinking with the condition the person or persons that removed the thing that 
used to sit in that spot on my desk, and the person he is thinking about does satisfy that 
condition.25  
 
One might also question whether these are in fact cases in which the thinker does not perceive 
the object. In the case that Kaplan discusses, Kaplan’s thinking of the computer-taker is not 
derived from his (or anyone else’s) seeing, hearing, or touching that person. But this is not 
decisive on the question of whether his thinking is derived from his perceiving that person. 
For he might be perceiving that person indirectly, much as he might perceive him by 
perceiving footage from a closed-circuit television monitor that caught the taker in the act, or 
through a still image captured from such footage. The crime scene might similarly be a kind 
of record through which one can, indirectly, perceive that person. The question of whether 
there is genuine perception through photograph and video images remains a live one in 
philosophical aesthetics.26 Even if this debate were settled in favour of there being such 
indirect perception, it is a further question whether there is also perception through other sorts 
of records or traces.  
 
These two lines of questioning need to be explored more fully to assess (i) whether thinking 
about things via evidence relies on those things satisfying conditions that are in thought, even 
if they fail to satisfy some other conditions that are in thought, and (ii) whether evidence 
provides an indirect perceptual link to things. If either of these claims proves defensible, then 
																																																						
25 For an extended discussion of these kinds of cases and this kind of response to them, see Dickie (2016, chapter 
6). Dickie argues that in such cases the objects are thought about neither by condition satisfaction (even of back-
up conditions) nor by acquaintance. 
26 The classic discussion is Walton (1984), where perception through photographs is defended as genuine 
perception. Criticisms and defences of Walton’s position include Currie (1991), Carroll (1996), Friday (1996), 
Walton (1997), Lopes (2003), Cohen and Meskin (2004), and Nanay (2010). 
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evidence cases are not a clear counterexample to BPA. This is an additional important line of 
inquiry in assessing BPA. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of advancing, challenging, and defending principles of acquaintance is to 
investigate the broader question of what it is for things genuinely to be in our thought. Much 
of the effort to do this since Russell has focused on the Content Principle of Acquaintance. 
This principle adopts being in, or figuring in, content as the mark of genuinely being in 
thought. There is no entailment from the Basic Principle of Acquaintance, which focuses on 
the difference between satisfactional and non-satisfactional thinking about things, to the 
Content Principle of Acquaintance. Thus, even if criticisms of CPA are decisive, they do not 
straightforwardly apply to BPA. Further, there are problems associated with using content to 
divide genuine from derivative being-in-thought. Taken together, these considerations favour 
at least taking seriously BPA as a route to shedding light on genuine being-in-thought. I have 
suggested that two key lines of investigation in evaluating BPA are (i) the question of whether 
a perceptual account of first-person thinking is viable, and (ii) the question of whether 
Kaplan’s and Dickie’s “evidence cases” are really cases of both non-satisfactional and non-
acquaintance-based thinking of things. These questions are of interest in their own right, and 
gain additional interest from their role in evaluating BPA. They should be approached with 
the distinction between CPA and BPA, and the choice of whether to use the notion of content 
in conceiving of genuine being-in-thought, firmly in mind. 
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